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Essay
Presidential Impeachment in Tribal Times: The
Historical Logic of Informal Constitutional Change
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN
The unconventional presidency of Donald Trump has made presidential
impeachment once again an issue of national concern. But existing legal
scholarship does not fully reflect what happened in past presidential
impeachments with respect to the meaning of the constitutional standard
(“high crimes and misdemeanors”). In this Essay, I argue that prior
scholarship has largely ignored the historical context and thus the useful
lessons of the three most prominent instances in which Congress attempted
to impeach and convict a president: those of Andrew Johnson, Richard
Nixon, and Bill Clinton. The Essay then goes beyond these episodes to
contribute to the ongoing debate in constitutional theory over theories of
informal constitutional change.
Impeachment scholarship is predominantly originalist. There is a large
measure of consensus on the meaning of the “high crimes and
misdemeanors” standard, which I call the “Hamiltonian vision.” The
Hamiltonian vision is that impeachment can be used for a broad category of
“political” offenses. Most scholars agree that impeachment does not require
an indictable offense or other violation of law. Despite this scholarly
consensus, the reality of the Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton impeachments was
quite different. Contrary to prior legal scholarship, I argue that a partypolitical logic overwhelmed the Framers’ design and created a situation in
which the position that impeachment is limited to indictable offenses could
not be effectively discredited.
I then use the example of impeachment to generalize about the process
of informal constitutional change to grasp what I call its “historical logic.”
The Essay goes beyond a simple reaffirmation of living constitutionalism to
advocate the value of an alternative methodology called “developmental”
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analysis. Developmental analysis makes explicit what is implicit in most
work on living constitutionalism–that it rests on a historicist approach in
which institutional changes such as political parties establish new
constitutional baselines which are the practical equivalent of constitutional
amendments. These baselines form the new context going forward for
evaluating the constitutionality of official action.
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Presidential Impeachment in Tribal Times: The
Historical Logic of Informal Constitutional Change
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN *
INTRODUCTION
Once again there is talk of impeaching a President.1 Although many
aspects of the Trump administration are surprising or even shocking,2 the
prospect that opposing members of Congress might introduce articles of
impeachment is not among them. In fact, this process has become almost a
standard feature of presidencies since Richard Nixon was nearly impeached
and convicted before resigning in August of 1974.3
*

W.R. Irby Chair and Rutledge C. Clement, Jr. Professor in Constitutional Law, Tulane Law
School. This Essay was presented at the inaugural meeting of the National Conference of Constitutional
Law Scholars, a worthy enterprise superintended by Andrew Coan in Tucson. My thanks to Andrew,
Brad Snyder and David Schwartz for organizing the conference. I’m grateful to Richard Primus, Brannon
Denning, and Ian Wurman for making comments at the conference, Mark Tushnet and Mike Seidman
for providing valuable feedback after an early conversation, and Michael Les Benedict and Aziz Huq for
providing written comments that influenced the final version. Email: sgriffin@tulane.edu. Copyright
2018 by Stephen M. Griffin.
1
See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Impeachment War, NEW YORKER, May 28, 2018, at 38 (“Today,
the impeachment of Donald Trump exists on the brink of plausibility.”). For examples of calls to impeach
President Trump, see David Leonhardt, An Article of Impeachment Against Donald J. Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/opinion/impeachment-donald-trump.html;
Nicholas Fandos, House Democrats Can’t Impeach Trump, but They’re Willing to Try, N.Y. TIMES
(October 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/impeachment-trump-greensherman.html; Alexander Burns, A Billionaire Keeps Pushing to Impeach Trump. Democrats Are
Rattled., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/us/politics/impeach-trumpdemocrats-tom-steyer.html.
2
For an early assessment of Trump’s transgressions against constitutional norms, see Neil S. Siegel,
Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177, 178 (2018).
3
In addition to the Clinton impeachment sponsored by Republicans, there were impeachment
resolutions filed by Democrats against George W. Bush and Donald Trump. See Kucinich Offers
Impeachment
Articles
Against
Bush,
CBS
NEWS
(June
9,
2008),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kucinich-offers-impeachment-articles-against-bush/ (reporting that a
Democratic Representative introduced thirty-five articles of impeachment against President Bush);
Maegan Vazquez, House Dems Introduce Impeachment Against Trump, CNN POLITICS (Nov. 26, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/15/politics/cohen-articles-of-impeachment/index.html (reporting on the
decision to bring five articles of impeachment against Trump). Impeachment was also actively considered
by Democrats during the Iran-Contra scandal in the Reagan administration. See STEPHEN W. STATHIS ET
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-763 GOV, CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS ON PRESIDENTIAL
IMPEACHMENT: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW at CRS-19 (1998) (“Representative Henry B. Gonzalez . . .
introduced a resolution impeaching President Ronald W. Reagan . . . includ[ing] six articles pertaining
to . . . the Iran-Contra matter . . . .”); see also Michael Wines, A Populist from Texas Who Bows to No
One, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/24/us/a-populist-from-texas-who-

418

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:2

Yet the party-political constitutional order that structures presidential
impeachment continues to elude legal scholars.4 In this Essay I argue that
scholars have largely ignored or misunderstood the historical context of
presidential impeachment. There are significant lessons in the three most
prominent instances in which Congress attempted to impeach and convict a
President: the impeachments of Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill
Clinton.5 This is somewhat surprising because in separation-of powers-law,
close attention to what “practice” teaches is ordinarily de rigueur.6 I argue
this lack of attention to context is part of a broader failure to recognize the
relevance of theories of informal constitutional change. Such theories
attempt to explain and account for significant legal-constitutional changes
that occur outside the Article V amendment process.7
Impeachment scholarship is predominantly originalist.8 To determine
the meaning of the Constitution, scholars focus on the Framers and the
bows-to-no-one.html (discussing the life of Henry B. Gonzales, the Democrat who demanded the
impeachment of Reagan).
4
For valuable studies of impeachment by jurists and legal scholars, see AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 198-204 (2005) (discussing the safeguards provided by the
impeachment process); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 1 (1973)
(explaining the main role of the impeachment process); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A
HANDBOOK 1 (1974) (discussing the possibility of presidential impeachment in 1974); MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 1
(1996) (noting the number of scholars that have studied the history of the impeachment process);
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, IMPEACHMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 1 (2018) (describing the
terminology of the impeachment process, or the usage of the term); JOHN R. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL
IMPEACHMENT 252–53 (1978) (discussing the future of the impeachment process in light of past attempts
to impeach presidents); RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION,
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 95 (1999) (detailing the rules of impeachment);
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE
AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 26–27, 83 (1992) (discussing specific instances of impeachment);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 83 (2017) (explaining the first attempt at
impeachment and emphasizing that impeachment is not a criminal prosecution); LAURENCE TRIBE &
JOSHUA MATZ, TO END A PRESIDENCY: THE POWER OF IMPEACHMENT 22–23 (2018) (discussing the
need for the impeachment process as a last resort).
5
There was also an attempt to impeach President John Tyler. SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 80–85.
6
See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the
Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 255 (2017) (clarifying the historical practice of
separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches).
7
For citations to recent theories of change, see Stephen M. Griffin, Understanding Informal
Constitutional Change 1–2, 5–8 (Tul. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 16-1, 2016) (describing the informal changes that have been made to the
Constitution).
8
This was certainly true of the Clinton impeachment. See John O. McGinnis, Impeachable
Defenses, POL’Y REV. (June 1, 1999), https://www.hoover.org/research/impeachable-defenses (detailing
that despite the usual rhetoric of law professors, due to extenuating circumstances, most base their
comments on impeachment on the theory of originalism). The constitutional scholars called to testify
before the House Judiciary Committee largely focused on understanding the meaning of “high crimes
and misdemeanors” through the lens of the writing and adoption of the Constitution. See Background
and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 234–36 (1998) (statement of Susan Low Bloch, Professor of Constitutional Law,
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9

English and American precedents the Framers relied on. During President
Clinton’s impeachment, for example, originalists were in clover as the
inquiry into the “high [c]rimes and [m]isdemeanors”10 standard concentrated
overwhelmingly on the eighteenth century evidence.11 These inquiries have
been repaid in that there is a large measure of consensus on the meaning of
this standard, a consensus I call the “Hamiltonian vision.” The Hamiltonian
vision is that impeachment can be used for a broad category of “political”
offenses. Specifically, most scholars agree that the grounds for impeachment
are not limited to indictable offenses or other violations of law.12
Despite this impressive scholarly consensus on the original meaning or
understanding of the Constitution, the historical reality of the Johnson,
Nixon, and Clinton impeachments is quite different. Contrary to previous
legal scholarship, I argue that a party-political logic overwhelmed the
Framers’ design and created a situation in which the position that
impeachment is limited to indictable offenses could not be effectively
discredited. In promoting this understanding, Presidents and their able
defenders argued that the impeachment process should be understood in
legalistic terms, and the grounds for impeachment should be construed in
the narrowest possible way.13 The Hamiltonian vision was displaced by a
constitutional order in which Presidents could be impeached only when the
opposing party controlled Congress, and then only for committing indictable
crimes, or at least significant violations of law.14 Understanding how this
happened requires appreciating the relevance of what I call the “historical
logic” of informal constitutional change.

Georgetown University Law Center) (describing the limitations placed on the impeachment process by
the text of the Constitution).
9
See AMAR, supra note 4, at 199 (noting that British law had no clear process for removing a king);
BERGER, supra note 4 (explaining the role of the impeachment process in England); BLACK, supra note
4, at 25 (detailing the punishment for treason under English law); GERHARDT, IMPEACHMENT: WHAT
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW, supra note 4, at 125 (explaining the influence of English law on the
formation of the impeachment process); SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 19–23 (explaining the effect that
previously being under English rule had on the framers). For information on whether the framers were
fully informed of the English precedents, see Jack N. Rakove, Statement on the Background and History
of Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 682, 684. For an innovative perspective on the “high crimes”
standard, see Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 349 (2010).
10
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
11
See McGinnis, supra note 8 (noting that professors have failed to give weight to important
evidence from the Framers’ era).
12
AMAR, supra note 4, at 200–01; BERGER, supra note 4, at 56; BLACK, supra note 4, at 33;
GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 103; GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 59–60; LABOVITZ, supra note 4, at 27;
POSNER, supra note 4, at 98; SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 154; TRIBE, supra note 4, at 26–27.
13
Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 280 (1998) (claiming that
grounds for impeachment in situations involving the president should be construed narrowly).
14
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 56 (describing the Hamilton view of impeachment); id. at 85
(explaining the role partisanship plays in impeachment efforts); TRIBE, supra note 4, at 26 (discussing
the idea that impeachment is defined by the Congress at the time).
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The approach I take here suggests the usefulness of looking to historical
practice and a “living constitutionalist” approach to constitutional
interpretation. It shows how someone faithfully applying an originalist
perspective would not be able to explain or properly evaluate what happened
in the Johnson, Nixon, or Clinton impeachments. This Essay, however, goes
beyond a simple reaffirmation of living constitutionalism. It demonstrates
the value of an alternative methodology I have advanced in prior work called
“developmental” analysis.15 Developmental analysis makes explicit what is
implicit in most work on living constitutionalism: that it rests on a historicist
approach in which institutional changes, such as political parties, establish
new constitutional baselines that are the practical equivalent of
constitutional amendments, which are thereafter used in evaluating the
constitutionality of official action.16
All this, of course, is preliminary. This Essay is mainly concerned with
showing that the Framers’ “Hamiltonian vision” of impeachment could not
be realized in a constitutional order run by political parties.17 The partypolitical alternative to their anachronistic vision continues to structure our
contemporary constitutional reality. I describe the Hamiltonian vision in Part
I. Part II examines what happened to this vision in the Johnson, Nixon, and
Clinton impeachments. Then, I discuss the implications for understanding
the historical logic of informal constitutional change in Part III.
I. THE HAMILTONIAN VISION OF PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT
Briefly stated, the Hamiltonian vision is that Presidents can be
impeached for “political” offenses that violate the public trust.18
Impeachment exists to provide a check on Presidents who fall short in
exercising the unique powers, duties, and responsibilities of their office.
Impeachable offenses are therefore not limited to the class of indictable
crimes or other violations of law.
I call this the “Hamiltonian” vision because one of the most quoted
statements on the meaning of the Constitution’s impeachment standard is
found in Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 65.19 In discussing the role of
the Senate in its “judicial character as a court for the trial of

15
See Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1222 (2008)
(discussing how the developmental theory can impact constitutional interpretation).
16
See id. at 1209–22. Bruce Ackerman’s work is of obvious relevance here, as he discusses how
constitutional conclusions of the American people have varied across centuries. In his most recent work,
3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014), he discusses the cycles
of constitutional history.
17
For a relevant work, see DAVID R. MAYHEW, PARTISAN BALANCE: WHY POLITICAL PARTIES
DON’T KILL THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 166 (2011).
18
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 56 (explaining the Hamiltonian vision).
19
THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
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impeachments,” he comments:
The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in other words
from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done
immediately to the society itself.21
Hamilton then remarks that it is highly likely that impeachments will
animate the “passions of the whole community,”22 a point to which I will
return.
Legal scholars have treated Hamilton’s commentary as definitive of the
impeachment standard in Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution, which
provides: “The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”23
We should notice that both here in Article II and elsewhere, the
Constitution uses terms describing the impeachment process ordinarily
associated with criminal matters. Hamilton does the same. The provision of
Article II just quoted refers to “[c]onviction”24 and of course identifies the
crimes of treason and bribery.25 Moreover, in the clause specifying the
Senate’s role, the Constitution uses words such as “try”26 and “convicted,”27
and further provides that Senators “shall be on [o]ath or [a]ffirmation,”28
suggesting the Senate assumes a judicial role during impeachments.29
Nonetheless, there has long been a consensus among constitutional
scholars that the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” is not limited to
indictable crimes.30 Indeed Michael Gerhardt, the leading scholar on the
impeachment process,31 describes the matter as so settled that “[t]he major
disagreement is not over whether impeachable offenses should be strictly
limited to indictable crimes, but rather over the range of nonindictable
20

THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Id.
22
Id.
23
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
27
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
28
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
29
For a recent example of the view that this language suggests a criminal standard, contrary to the
Hamiltonian vision, see Nikolas Bowie, High Crimes Without Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 59, 66-71
(2018).
30
For an incisive recent discussion, see TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 4, at 44–47.
31
See the works by Professor Gerhardt. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra
note 4; GERHARDT, IMPEACHMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW, supra note 4.
21
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offenses on which an impeachment may be based.”
Thus, the prevailing understanding, based on many scholarly studies, is
that “high crimes and misdemeanors” is a term of art.33 It is a specialized
phrase adopted to connote that impeachable offenses can include ordinary
crimes, violations of law (including the Constitution), and other, presumably
serious, non-criminal offenses.34 As well stated by Cass Sunstein, a
prominent theme in recent commentary is that this standard can be met by
an “egregious violation of the public trust.”35
This interpretation of “high crimes and misdemeanors” is further
supported by what has been termed “structural reasoning” or examining the
logic of how the Constitution apportions responsibilities to the different
branches.36 As Charles Black argues in his influential short book on
impeachment, the Constitution gives the President certain unique powers
and duties, such as the commander-in-chief power and the duty to “faithfully
execute[]” the laws.37 Black poses the question of what the remedy would
be if the President fails to perform these duties.38 He offers the examples of
a President who moves to Saudi Arabia and proposes to conduct presidential
business remotely or who announces an unconstitutional religious test for
employment in his administration.39 Although these are not crimes, a number
of scholars agree with Black’s argument that impeachment would be the
appropriate remedy.40 That means that high crimes can include misfeasance
in office— something that is not an ordinary or indictable crime.41 A further
implication is that impeachment can be appropriate for matters that do not
involve violating any law, whether the law specifies criminal penalties or
not. This point is worth restating: according to the Hamiltonian vision,
Presidents do not have to be lawbreakers to be placed in jeopardy of
impeachment.42
32

GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 4, at 103 (footnotes omitted).
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 12 (Comm. Print 1974); Bob Barr, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The
Clinton-Gore Scandals and the Question of Impeachment, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 12 (1997). See also
Sam Nunn, Judicial Tenure, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 29, 41 (1977) (discussing “high crimes and
misdemeanors” being understood as a term of art).
34
This was the argument of the House Judiciary Committee staff during Watergate. STAFF OF H.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 33, at 23.
35
SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 55.
36
See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 74 (1982)
(describing structural arguments generally and providing an example of a structural argument). Bobbitt
cites Black as an inspiration. Id. at 76–77.
37
BLACK, supra note 4, at 43 (emphasis omitted).
38
Id. at 33.
39
Id. at 33–34.
40
See AMAR, supra note 4, at 200; TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 4, at 50.
41
See id. at 34–35 (providing an example of misfeasance that could amount to a high crime).
42
See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 20, at 439 (explaining that impeachments are offenses that are
“political” in nature, but making no mention that a law need be broken for a president to be impeached).
33
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My thesis is that although the Hamiltonian vision points away from
limiting impeachable offenses to indictable crimes or other violations of law,
changes to the American constitutional order in the nineteenth century that
are very much still with us—notably the advent of the party system43—made
it difficult to implement. In each of the three presidential impeachments
discussed in Part II, those advocating impeachment found themselves forced
to argue in terms of whether the President had committed a crime or other
violation of law.44 At the same time, because of the constraints imposed by
the prevailing constitutional order, they were unable to make the
Hamiltonian vision persuasive to those skeptical of impeachment.45 To
appreciate this change of fortune, it is useful to develop the logic of
Hamilton’s vision a bit further.
Hamilton’s commentary is often used in a negative way, that is, to rebut
the argument that impeachable offenses are limited to indictable crimes.46
Suppose we turn our attention to the positive side. What sort of non-criminal
offenses might be implicated by Hamilton’s vision? Any answer will be
necessarily speculative, as Hamilton and the other Framers did not address
this question in detail. I suggest we can make progress if we keep in view
Hamilton’s contention that impeachable offenses concern violations of the
public trust.47 To move forward, we must enrich the rather sparse historical
context concerning the eighteenth century, often employed in debates about
presidential impeachment.
According to historian Gordon Wood, Hamilton and the founding
generation thought of themselves as civilized “gentlemen of leisure,” who
perhaps treasured their honor above all else.48 Recall Hamilton’s
commentary in Federalist No. 65 begins by referring to “the misconduct of
public men.”49 In the eighteenth century, such gentlemen fought their
political battles through the artful use of rhetoric, pamphleteering, and even

43

See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2312, 2320–25 (2006) (“[T]he rise of partisan politics worked a revolution in the American
system of separation of powers, radically realigning the incentives of politicians and officeholders.”).
44
See infra text accompanying notes 73, 116–20, and 144.
45
Id.
46
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 14–15 (Comm. Print 1974).
47
See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 20, at 439 (noting that the subject of an impeachment court’s
jurisdiction is “violation of some public trust”).
48
GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS DIFFERENT
14 15, 22 23 (2006). One note of explanation: they were—or aspired to be—“gentlemen of leisure” in
the sense that they were not dependent on others for employment or income. Id. at 16 17. On the
importance of honor to the founding generation, see JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR:
NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC xvi (2001).
49
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 20, at 439.
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by fighting duels such as the one that famously led to Hamilton’s demise.50
Wood remarks that in this world, “important offices of government were
supposed to be held only by those who had already established their social
and moral superiority.”51
Hamilton may have believed that it was unlikely any member of the
founding generation would commit an impeachable offense.52 If you thought
that George Washington would be the first President and similar paragons
of virtue would be elected in the future, your attention would not be drawn
to further detailing the nature of impeachable offenses. Notice, however,
how these historical conjectures lead us away from the position that
impeachable offenses must be concerned primarily with crimes or other
violations of law. Gentlemen who take a code of honor seriously would be
unlikely to commit such offenses and, indeed, the record of the early
Republic is noticeably free from convictions for corruption for those
officials covered by the impeachment standard.
If we understand the Hamiltonian vision as centering on the concept of
the public trust, then impeachable offenses presumably have to do with
evaluating the President’s conduct in sustaining that trust with respect to the
powers and duties of the office. But it is much easier to perform this
evaluation if we all share the same norms of how to behave in office. For the
Founders, this was not difficult because they believed that only gentlemen
were fit to serve their country.53 We can therefore make sense of Hamilton’s
concept of the public trust if we assume a consensus about how Presidents
ought to behave in office. In fact, for Hamilton and his contemporaries, how
public officials were expected to behave in office was no different from how
they were expected to behave in general.54 How they were to behave in office
was simply an extension of how they behaved in society.55 The founding
generation believed that their leaders would emerge from this class of
gentlemen.56
But suppose society changes? What if changes to the social order and
political life make it more difficult for gentlemen to be elected? The
consensus on what constitutes proper behavior in office and thus, the scope
50
WOOD, supra note 48, at 248. See also Burr Slays Hamilton in Duel, HISTORY (NOV. 24, 2009),
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/burr-slays-hamilton-in-duel (highlighting the duel that
killed Hamilton).
51
Id. at 267.
52
See NICOL C. RAE & COLTON C. CAMPBELL, IMPEACHING CLINTON: PARTISAN STRIFE ON
CAPITOL HILL 23 24 (2004) (explaining that the Founders did not believe a corrupt person would ever
become president and that Hamilton thought only qualified men would be elected).
53
See WOOD, supra note 48, at 15 (“Being a gentleman was the prerequisite to becoming a political
leader . . . . It meant, in short, having all those characteristics that we today sum up in the idea of a liberal
arts education.”).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See id. at 17 (explaining that public office was a responsibility required of certain gentlemen as
a result of their faculties, independence, and prominence in society).

2019]

PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT IN TRIBAL TIMES

425

of impeachable offenses, might well break down. There is no doubt that each
of the presidential impeachments discussed in Part II occurred in a much
different political world from that of the early Republic. Nevertheless, for
each impeachment I will speculate about the implications of the Hamiltonian
vision for the presidential conduct at issue. What the evidence suggests is
that to mediate between the substantive differences between Hamilton’s
world and the nineteenth century party-political world, advocates of
presidential impeachment emphasized the apparent clarity provided by the
criminal law model. Put broadly, instead of violations of an eighteenth
century gentlemen’s code of honor, Presidents were nearly uniformly
accused of committing indictable offenses or other violations of law. The
focus of attention became less a political judgment of whether the President
had performed his duties honorably in a way that preserved the public trust,
and more on issues of criminality and due process—all accompanied by
appropriate lawyerly arguments.
It turns out that the Hamiltonian vision is hard to maintain in a
constitutional order dominated by nationally-organized political parties. In
such an order, interactions between the President and Congress are “partypolitical,” that is, deeply influenced by partisan allegiances and the alwayspressing need to advance party interests. As we noted above, it is true that
Hamilton refers to partisan passions in his discussion of impeachment.57 But
it is well known that the Framers were not supportive of and did not
anticipate the development of political parties.58 Hamilton cannot be
construed as commenting on a nationally-organized party system in The
Federalist because it did not come into existence until later in the nineteenth
century.59 This ruthlessly partial and deliberately oppositional way of
organizing politics was alien to the esteemed gentlemen who wrote and
ratified the Constitution.
II. THREE PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENTS
When transiting from the Hamiltonian vision to the real world of
presidential impeachment, we should take note initially of one significant
difference made by the introduction of party politics. Whatever we think of
the conduct of Johnson, Nixon, or Clinton, the fact is that each of these partyaligned Presidents inevitably had defenders in Congress searching for
plausible ways to get them out of trouble.60 No matter how low their conduct
might have ranked in the estimation of the eighteenth century gentry, and
57

See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 20, at 439–40 (explaining the “political” nature of
impeachments).
58
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780 1840, at 2–3 (1972).
59
See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 43, at 2320 25 (describing the rise of political parties and
partisan politics in the nineteenth century).
60
See infra text accompanying notes 100 (Johnson), 121 (Nixon), and 171–72 (Clinton).
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for that matter, regardless of how troubled members of their own party were
by their actions, none of these Presidents were ever completely abandoned
(although Nixon came close). This party-logic had important implications
for whether the impeachment standard favored by the Framers could be
implemented effectively.
A. The Impeachment (and Near-Conviction) of Andrew Johnson
Historical records show that Andrew Johnson was impeached by
“radical” Republicans for violating the Tenure of Office Act,61 but the effort
to remove him fell just short of the two-thirds required for conviction by the
Senate.62 It is still regarded today as an unfortunate example of the use of
the impeachment process for purely political ends.63
Well, no. This is regrettably the story still told by jurists and legal
scholars64 but not by historians who have studied the Johnson case closely.
There may be reasons why—for constitutional scholars at least—Andrew
Johnson’s impeachment remains a hard case, relating to the dubious
constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act,65 which Johnson was accused
of violating. Legal scholars continue to refer to the Johnson impeachment as
“ill-advised” and “highly politicized.”66 It is often described as being
instituted by “radicals in Congress as part of the battle over control of
Reconstruction.”67
This conventional account is highly problematic considering the
transformation in Reconstruction historiography.68 Yet influential legal
commentaries give no sign that the broader history of Reconstruction is even
relevant to assessing the Johnson impeachment.69 Ever since the publication
of Michael Les Benedict’s path-breaking book,70 for example, historians
have known that there is a plausible case that Johnson deserved removal
61

Tenure of Office Act, §§ 1, 2 (1867) (repealed 1887).
See Erin Blakemore, 150 Years Ago, a President Could Be Impeached for Firing a Cabinet
Member, HISTORY (May 16, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/andrew-johnson-impeachmenttenure-of-office-act (explaining how Johnson violated the Tenure of Office Act and was impeached by
the House, but ultimately evaded impeachment by one vote).
63
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 101.
64
See, e.g., id. (presenting the old story).
65
On the Act’s probable unconstitutionality, see the discussion in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 164–67, 170–76 (1926).
66
PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
230 (2d ed. 2005).
67
Id.
68
For more information on this topic, see the sources cited in MICHAEL LES BENEDICT,
PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
RECONSTRUCTION ERA 233 n.13 (2006).
69
For a valuable discussion of the Johnson impeachment and Reconstruction history, see KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
113–57 (1999).
70
MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 58–59 (1973).
62
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from office. For some reason, the boundaries between disciplines have
proved unusually impermeable with respect to understanding the Johnson
impeachment.72 Benedict’s analysis has been mostly ignored by legal
scholars.
Taking into consideration the studies of Reconstruction by Benedict and
other historians, the more accurate short version is that Congress wanted to
impeach Johnson for abusing his constitutional powers to obstruct the
enforcement of federal laws. Although what I have termed the Hamiltonian
vision would have permitted this, the prevailing interpretation of the
Constitution did not.73 This meant Republicans opposed to Johnson’s
reckless and racist course of action had to create a situation in which Johnson
was forced to violate a law—the Tenure of Office Act—to trigger the
impeachment process.74 Once the impeachment process began in earnest,
Johnson retreated, sending signals that he would no longer obstruct the
progress of Reconstruction.75 As a practical matter, this made removal
unnecessary and the effort to convict Johnson foundered in the Senate.76
One of Benedict’s most important contributions was to show that the
immediate reason for Johnson’s impeachment in 1868—his removal of
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton—was simply the final straw in a long list
of constitutional transgressions against Congress.77 Indeed, saying the
Johnson impeachment was about “removal” is uncomfortably similar to
saying the Civil War was about “states’ rights.” Understanding the
impeachment solely through the flawed lens of removal obscures the
historical context of Johnson’s actions.78
It is sometimes said that the dispute between Johnson and congressional
Republicans concerned Reconstruction “policy,” as if the freighted end of
an immensely destructive civil war could be treated as just another issue.79
But there was a crucially important constitutional context.80 Reconstruction
posed fundamental issues in terms of the legal position of the former
71

E.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 69, at 136–37.
Keith Whittington, a political scientist, suggests this is due to the Clinton impeachment having
“served to bury a whole generation of scholarship on the Johnson episode that had helped rehabilitate the
Reconstruction-Era Congress and explain the impeachment.” Keith E. Whittington, Bill Clinton Was No
Andrew Johnson: Comparing Two Impeachments, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 422, 424 (2000) (footnote
omitted) .
73
See BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 26–36 (explaining the narrow and broad views of the law of
impeachment).
74
WHITTINGTON, supra note 69, at 114–15.
75
Id. at 137–39.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 39–40, 42–49, 53, 58–59, 75–78, 89–90, 92, 130.
78
See id. at 58–60 (demonstrating that Stanton’s removal was not the sole reason for Johnson’s
impeachment).
79
See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 4, at 262 (arguing that a President “is not to be removed merely
for differing with Congress”).
80
TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 4, at 55–56; Whittington, supra note 72, at 425.
72
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Confederate states: whether the new legal status of the freedmen would be
respected and whether intransigent southern whites would be successful in
using unlawful means—including systematic violence—to frustrate the
building of a new political and constitutional order ultimately based on
Lincoln’s promise of a “new birth of freedom.”81
Benedict argued that the entire Republican party, not just “radicals,”82
became alienated from Johnson because his “mild restoration policy”83 of
presidential reconstruction served as a strong signal to southern whites that
they could evade the consequences of the war.84 If left unchecked by
Congress, this meant a restoration of white supremacy in the South, a state
of affairs that would lead to the new Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
becoming mere parchment barriers. And Johnson’s signals were received
loud and clear. The South grew more resistant to efforts to promote racial
equality and with every failure by the Republicans to advance impeachment,
Johnson’s policy grew more tolerant of the necessarily violent effort to
restore white supremacy.85
By 1866, the incessant conflict between Johnson and Congress created
a brewing crisis in Washington. Yet Johnson had his defenders, and when
the question of impeachment was raised, they argued that a President could
be impeached only for violating a criminal statute.86 As we have seen, this
is directly contrary to the Hamiltonian vision.87 Certainly the commission of
a crime can count as an impeachable offense.88 But the Hamiltonian vision
allows Congress to go beyond the commission of crimes to consider political
offenses against the public trust. Yet it is just this broader reading of “high
crimes and misdemeanors” that had trouble getting traction in the Johnson
impeachment.89 As recounted by Benedict, many eminent Republicans in
the House of Representatives “voted to impeach Johnson only when satisfied
that he was guilty of a criminal violation of a congressional statute.”90 This
understanding, common enough at the time, ran counter to the constitutional
design.91 Yet it nonetheless came to structure the entire impeachment effort.
81
President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). See also Whittington, supra
note 72, at 427–31 (describing Johnson’s actions regarding the former Confederate states).
82
BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 8.
83
Id. at 21.
84
Id. at 21–22.
85
Id. at 71, 75–78, 89–90, 130.
86
Id. at 27.
87
See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text (explaining that under the Hamiltonian vision,
impeachment can be used for a broad range of “political” offenses).
88
See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text (noting that the Hamiltonian vision would find a
broad range of crimes as impetus for impeachment).
89
Whittington’s careful analysis generally supports the argument here. WHITTINGTON, supra note
69, at 145–52.
90
BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 141.
91
For a description of how this argument was made in the Johnson impeachment, see Bowie, supra
note 29.
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In his magisterial history of Reconstruction, Eric Foner summarizes the
problems with the case the House made against Johnson:
[F]rom the outset, the case against the President was beset with
weaknesses. Of the eleven articles of impeachment, nine
hinged on either the removal of Stanton or an alleged attempt
to induce Gen. Lorenzo Thomas to accept orders not
channeled through Grant. Two others, drafted by Butler and
Stevens, charged the President with denying the authority of
Congress and attempting to bring it ‘into disgrace.’ Nowhere
were the real reasons Republicans wished to dispose of
Johnson mentioned—his political outlook, the way he had
administered the Reconstruction Acts, and his sheer
incompetence. In a Parliamentary system, Johnson would long
since have departed, for nearly all Republicans by now agreed
with Supreme Court Justice David Davis, who described the
President as ‘obstinate, self-willed, combative,’ and totally
unfit for his office. But these, apparently, were not
impeachable offenses. Despite the changes made by Butler
and Stevens, the articles as a whole implicitly accepted what
would become the central premise of Johnson’s defense: that
only a clear violation of the law warranted a President’s
removal.92
The assumptions concerning the meaning of the “high crimes and
misdemeanors” standard that structured the Johnson impeachment is a good
example of a serious and pervasive problem with the project of perpetuating
a constitutional design over many generations. The Hamiltonian vision
permitted a President to be impeached for non-criminal actions.93 In
addition, as Benedict argues, there was strong support for the Hamiltonian
vision in nineteenth century legal commentary.94 None of that seemed to
help Johnson’s accusers. The Hamiltonian vision foundered without a clear
way to implement it in the new party-political constitutional order.
By eighteenth century standards, it should have been possible to
impeach Andrew Johnson for what, after all, he had actually done.95 As
summarized by Benedict, “it was plain by the winter of 1867–68 that the
President of the United States was consciously and determinedly following
92
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 334–35
(1988) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
93
See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text (explaining the theories of the Hamiltonian vision).
94
See BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 26–36 (discussing the strong legal commentary of Hamiltonian
vision interpreters at the time).
95
Whittington relevantly comments: “While his impeachment was a partisan affair, congressional
Republicans understood Johnson to be a threat to the constitutional order itself.” Whittington, supra note
72, at 450.
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a program designed to nullify congressional legislation through the exercise
of his power as chief executive.”96 It could be added that there was strong
evidence Johnson was acting from racist motives for possibly racist ends,
including the maintenance of white supremacy.97 Moreover, his official
actions had the foreseeable effect of abrogating the civil rights of blacks and
loyalist whites in the South and fomenting violence against them. This
would constitute quite a bill of indictment.
Yet consider what happened as party-political logic took hold in the
impeachment process. Party politics meant that Johnson had defenders, and
they searched for legalistic ways to slow down the process and retain him in
office. As noted in Part I, some of what the Constitution says about
impeachment works against a clear understanding that it is not centrally
focused on the commission of crimes.98 The Constitution appears to
contemplate a full judicial trial in the Senate, for example.99 Appeals to
fairness and due process are part of the American constitutional tradition.100
And so in the Johnson impeachment, senators thought they were serving as
a court and that the rules and procedures of common law trials therefore
applied, despite objections by the House managers.101 This delayed a vote to
convict by weeks, although there was no real dispute concerning the facts.102
The main effect of party-political logic was paradoxically to obscure that
it would be legitimate to remove Johnson for non-criminal, “political”
offenses. Johnson’s defenders, including influential Republicans like
Senator Fessenden, argued that a high burden of proof was appropriate
because the results of an election and the future of the Presidency were at

96

MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A New Look at the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, in PRESERVING

THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA 32, 39

(2006).
97
FONER, supra note 92, at 179–81, 190–91. We should not overlook the significance of Johnson’s
racism in assessing his impeachment. Normally we think it is relevant whether our leaders advocate for
policies from racist motives and for racist purposes. Yet somehow, legal scholarship has not fully caught
up with this aspect of Johnson’s conduct as president.
98
For an account of how this argument was used in the Johnson impeachment, see Bowie, supra
note 29.
99
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. (“The Vice President of the United States shall be President of
the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”).
100
See David Resnick, Due Process and Procedural Fairness, 18 NOMOS 206, 206 (explaining that
due process is a fundamental constitutional principle); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the
Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1060 (stating that fairness is a fundamental concept of due
process).
101
See BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 153 (showing that the majority of Senators refused to admit
testimony, while Republican Senators dissented); REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 240, 245 (stating that
Senators wrote opinions after hearing the case and well-known Republicans voted to acquit Johnson).
102
See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 226–27, 234 (noting that the vote originally scheduled for May
11 did not occur until May 26 and explaining how the lack of dispute over the facts rendered the evidence
presented unnecessary).
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stake (never mind that Johnson was an accidental President). Indeed,
Fessenden stated that any offenses must be “free from the taint of party,”104
something difficult to accomplish when parties controlled the government.
Given such an atmosphere, we can appreciate the appeal of accusing the
President of committing a serious crime or other similarly serious violation
of law. If strictly legal (as opposed to Hamilton’s “political”) offenses were
alleged, then presumably the machinery of the law could be deployed to
fairly assess Johnson’s guilt.105 Attention thus turned to constraining
Johnson through the legal tripwire of the Tenure of Office Act.106 This helps
explain the tremendous Republican excitement—the sense that a dam was
breaking—when Johnson finally removed Stanton from office.107 Surely this
was the clear and significant violation of the law needed for an impeachment
conviction. Thus, the impeachment drama lurched into forward gear without
any adequate consideration of the eighteenth century standards written in the
Constitution that Hamilton faithfully glossed in The Federalist. In legalizing
the impeachment process,108 Republicans had succeeded in defanging it of
the “taint of party.”109 They had also frustrated the original constitutional
design.
B. The Presumed Impeachment and Conviction of Richard Nixon
Inextricably caught in the coils of Watergate, Richard Nixon resigned
from office in August 1974.110 Just prior to his resignation and after lengthy
deliberation, the House Judiciary Committee adopted three articles of
impeachment.111 Given the strength of the evidence against him at that time,
and the evidence that emerged immediately after the vote,112 everyone
assumed Nixon would have been impeached and convicted on a bipartisan
vote in the Democratic-controlled House and Senate.113
103
BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 178–79. For a modern version of this view, see Background and
History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 235 (1998) (statement of Susan Low Bloch, Professor of Constitutional Law,
Georgetown University Law Center).
104
BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 179.
105
See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 218, 222–23, 240, 245 (illustrating that Congress turned to a
legal procedure in an effort to avoid political party motivations in evaluating Johnson’s guilt).
106
SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 105.
107
FONER, supra note 92, at 334.
108
See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 17–18
(1996) (explaining the concept of the legalization of the Constitution and its implications on politics).
109
BENEDICT, supra note 70, at 179.
110
See STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON
(1990) (providing a comprehensive overview of Watergate).
111
Id. at 516–26.
112
Here I refer to the impact of the release of the June 23, 1972 tape in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
113
KUTLER, supra note 110, at 522.
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Scholars differ over how to describe the articles of impeachment against
Nixon, but Article I rather plainly accused him of a serious federal crime
obstruction of justice to cover up White House involvement in the June 1972
break-in of Democratic National Committee headquarters.114 Article II
became known as the “abuse of power” article, but in fact featured
allegations of multiple counts of violations of law.115 For example, the
Committee concluded that Nixon had “repeatedly engaged in conduct
violating the constitutional rights of citizens, impairing the due and proper
administration of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, or contravening
the laws governing agencies of the executive branch and the purposes of
these agencies.”116 Article III defended the prerogatives of the House by
accusing Nixon of having failed to produce evidence when required to do so
by subpoenas issued by the Committee.117 It is uncertain whether this last
Article would have served as a bipartisan basis for impeachment in the full
House and Senate.118
Much like Andrew Johnson’s defenders, President Nixon’s attorneys
argued that impeachment could be based only on criminal offenses.119
Anticipating this line of argument, the House Judiciary Committee’s staff
produced an important report that summarized the case for not so limiting
impeachment.120 It remains a common impression of Watergate that the
articles of impeachment rejected the notion that impeachment had to be
based on “serious acts which would be indictable as criminal offenses.”121
While some Democrats probably believed this, a review of the historical
record shows that the most persuasive articles of impeachment were based
on evidence that Nixon committed the crime of obstruction of justice.122 This
is ultimately the reason Nixon lost political support among members of his

114
PETER W. RODINO, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-1305, at 2 (1974).
115
Id. at 3–4.
116
Id. at 3.
117
Id. at 4.
118
KUTLER, supra note 110, at 529–30.
119
Id. at 477–78.
120
See STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG.,
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 22–25 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter
STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY] (arguing that impeachment should not be confined to cases
involving criminal conduct and stating that “[t]he American experience with impeachment . . . reflects
the principle that impeachable conduct need not be criminal.”).
121
See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 421 (18th ed.
2013) (“[T]he staff of the Judiciary Committee insisted that the scope of impeachable offenses and of
criminality are not synonymous, and that the impeachment route may reach serious abuses of office or
breaches of trust even when they do not constitute criminal acts.”).
122
See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 1–3 (1974) (noting that President Nixon “has prevented,
obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice” and listing nine “means used to implement this
course of conduct”).

2019]

PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT IN TRIBAL TIMES

433

123

own party and had to resign from office.
To understand the dynamics of the Nixon impeachment, we should
understand that it did not occur in a hyper-partisan or tribal atmosphere when
party loyalty was expected to govern no matter what occurred. To be sure,
many Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee were indeed
loyal to Nixon and could barely tolerate the thought that some members of
their party might vote for his impeachment.124 It was certainly appreciated
at the time that the Republican minority members held the key to a
legitimate—that is, bipartisan—impeachment process.125 In explaining
impeachment procedures in the House, for example, prominent
constitutional scholar Charles Black assured his audience that the
Democratic majority would strive to avoid “a close vote along party lines—
a vote whereby Republicans and Democrats divide as such.”126 In that case,
Black felt that the taint of “party motives”127 would undermine the
legitimacy of the impeachment.128 He postulated that this dynamic would
lead to “some compromise” calculated to win the support of the minority
members of the Judiciary Committee and similarly in the full House and
Senate.129 Black well-anticipated what happened on the Committee in the
Nixon impeachment, although—as I will argue below—his insights did not
carry over to the far more partisan tenor of the Clinton impeachment.130
What Black may not have anticipated was that the party compromise
necessary for a legitimate impeachment would turn the Committee’s inquiry
in the direction of relying on allegations of criminality.
The path of the House Judiciary Committee’s impeachment inquiry was
strongly influenced by the ongoing investigation conducted by the
Watergate grand jury, led by special prosecutor Leon Jaworski after the
October 1973 “Saturday Night massacre” firing of Archibald Cox.131 The

123
See, e.g., James M. Naughton, Nixon Slide From Power: Backers Gave Final Push, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 1974), https://www.nytimes.com/1974/08/12/archives/nixon-slide-from-power-backers-gavefinal-push-former-defenders.html (noting that after Senate Republican Whip Robert P. Griffin learned of
President Nixon’s attempts “to persuade the Federal Bureau of Investigation to abandon crucial early
clues as to the scope of the Watergate scandal,” Griffin stated that “[t]here was no doubt in my own mind
then that the President should resign, had to resign”).
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KUTLER, supra note 110, at 479, 499.
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Id. at 504.
126
BLACK, supra note 4, at 8.
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Id. at 8–9.
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Id.
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Id. at 9.
130
See discussion infra Section II.C.
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Bart Barnes, Watergate Prosecutor Faced Down the President, WASH. POST (May 30, 2004),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1755-2004May29.html?noredirect=on (“Cox was
replaced by Leon Jaworski, who eventually got the disputed tapes, and the Watergate investigation
continued.”). Michael Gerhardt insightfully argues that federal prosecutors have exerted an increasing
influence over recent impeachments, including the Nixon and Clinton impeachments. Michael J.
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Committee’s effort was greatly enhanced when it received a trove of
evidence from the grand jury in early 1974.132 As summarized by historian
Melvin Small, this material was “essential to the proceedings—800 pages of
documents, 13 tape recordings, and a 60-page report or ‘road map’ to the
evidence.”133 In fact, Judiciary Committee chief counsel John Doar was
more deeply indebted to Jaworski’s staff attorneys than anyone appreciated
at the time. Doar had to have this voluminous record and how it related to
the criminal charges against Nixon and his subordinates explained to him in
multiple sessions.134 Considering the relative expertise of Doar and
Jaworski’s able crew of lawyers, this is understandable. Jaworski’s staff had
been examining the evidence, including Nixon’s famed tapes, intensively for
months prior to the beginning of the Committee’s inquiry.135 Yet this meant
that the grand jury’s exclusive focus on criminal offenses would influence
the Committee’s inquiry and thus the eventual articles of impeachment. And
why not? Everyone agreed that serious criminal offenses could be grounds
for impeachment.
The submission of information from the grand jury was also important
because the Committee lacked the time and inclination to pursue its own
independent inquiry. Besides, as a practical matter, such an inquiry was
unnecessary. As Stanley Kutler describes, by summer 1974, much of the
relevant evidence had already been aired—in public by the Senate Select
Committee on Watergate the previous summer,136 by the grand jury in its
closed sessions, and through Nixon’s public submission of transcripts of
taped conversations.137
Focusing on criminality had other advantages. An inquiry based on
evidence that Nixon had committed crimes solved the political problem
faced by the conservative southern Democrats and independent-minded
Republicans who held the bipartisan balance of power on the Committee.138
It is understandable that Republicans especially were torn between party
loyalty and the relentless accumulation of evidence against Nixon. Evidence
of criminality provided the best possible protection against charges by their
voters that they had abandoned their president. As Kutler remarks, “no
member dared vote for impeachment without effective certainty of the
Gerhardt, The Historical and Constitutional Significance of the Impeachment and Trial of President
Clinton, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 358–59 (1999).
132
MELVIN SMALL, THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD NIXON 291 (1999).
133
Id.
134
KUTLER, supra note 110, at 482.
135
Id. at 480 (noting that Doar did not have his staff hired until March 1974).
136
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6, 2018).
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President’s guilt.” This made the proof of criminal actions offered by the
Watergate grand jury quite attractive. In the end, most of the members who
provided the essential bipartisan imprimatur to impeachment were
persuaded that Nixon had committed the crime of obstruction of justice and
had abused his power by violating the law.140 In fact, the bipartisan coalition
that provided the necessary votes to impeach saw articles I and II “as
different sides of the same coin.”141 This is because they both rested
ultimately on issues of criminality and violations of the law.
Finally, Nixon did not resign merely because plausible articles of
impeachment were filed against him, but rather because his political support
vanished once clear evidence emerged that he had committed a serious
crime.142 Like any good politician in a party-based democracy, he measured
success in terms of what political support he had from his own party (and
southern Democrats, de facto Republican party affiliates).143 But any chance
that his party might protect him against conviction in the Senate disappeared
in the wake of the revelation of the June 23, 1972 tape in which Nixon was
heard to order the use of the CIA to shut down the FBI investigation into the
Watergate burglary.144 In the ensuing overwhelmingly negative political
reaction, which included members of his own party castigating him and
calling for his resignation, Nixon was forced to resign.145 It is emblematic of
the Nixon impeachment that this tape was viewed as the long-awaited
“smoking gun” that definitively proved Nixon’s guilt. That his impeachment
became so focused around the question of guilt shows the dominance of the
criminal model in presidential impeachments.
C. The Impeachment and Survival of Bill Clinton
So far, I have argued that the Johnson and Nixon impeachments
occurred within a party-political framework or constitutional order which
had a profound effect on how the Constitution was interpreted and thus on
notions about what constituted a legitimate impeachment.146 Although the
participants knew in a sense that removing a President for non-criminal
conduct was an option, they were impelled by the logic of the constitutional
order to focus overwhelmingly on allegations of criminality and violations
of the law.147 With the historical context of these two impeachments firmly
139
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grasped, certain similarities and asymmetries with the Clinton impeachment
should now be in view.
Even more so than with Nixon, the Clinton impeachment was totally
dominated by the question of Clinton’s criminal guilt. This was partly due
to institutional developments which should be of interest.148 In contemporary
times, the House Judiciary Committee has had trouble doing the job on its
own. Once again, the Committee followed the lead of a special prosecutor
(now “independent counsel” Kenneth Starr)149 in charge of a grand jury
whose mission was, of course, to focus on the commission of crimes.150 The
report Starr submitted to Congress focused nearly exclusively on allegations
that President Clinton had committed the federal crimes of perjury and
obstruction of justice.151 The Republican-led Committee transmuted Starr’s
report into four articles of impeachment submitted to the full House, all but
one of which focused on allegations that Clinton had committed crimes.
Specifically, Article I charged Clinton with having committed perjury before
a federal grand jury, 152 Article II with perjury in the process of discovery in
the civil action brought against him by Paula Jones,153 and Article III that he
had obstructed justice in the Jones case.154 Article IV charged Clinton with
failing to respond and making false statements to the House Judiciary
Committee.155 Clinton was impeached by the House by a mostly party-line
vote on Articles I and III.156
At the same time, there was an obvious and highly consequential
asymmetry between the Nixon and Clinton impeachments. By the late
148
As Whittington describes developments in the 1970s and 1980s: “Our recent impeachment
experience has emphasized relatively clear cases of criminal wrongdoing by public officials. The long
drama of Watergate in the 1970s and the spectacle of criminally convicted and imprisoned federal judges
in the 1980s were relatively easy cases that emphasized criminality as the sufficient condition for
impeachment.” Whittington, supra note 72, at 460.
149
Starr’s investigation was authorized under the now-defunct independent counsel law. See
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–270, 108 Stat. 732 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 591–99 (1994)) (stating that the purpose of the Act was, in part, “[t]o reauthorize the
independent counsel law for an additional 5 years”).
150
See Whittington, supra note 72, at 453 (“[T]he focus of Starr’s investigation was necessarily on
violations of the criminal law.”).
151
See KENNETH W. STARR, THE STARR REPORT: THE FINDINGS OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
KENNETH W. STARR ON PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THE LEWINSKY AFFAIR 153–55 (1998) (characterizing
the impeachment inquiry as a federal criminal investigation resulting in eleven grounds for
impeachment). Starr also alleged that Clinton had not faithfully executed the law by, for example,
misleading the American people about his affair with Monica Lewinsky and unlawfully invoking
executive privilege. Id. at 244–52.
152
H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. art I (1998) (as reported in the H.R., Dec. 15, 1998).
153
Id. at art. II. This was also the subject of Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
154
Id. at art. III.
155
Id. at art. IV.
156
See Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Clinton Impeached: House Approves Articles Charging
Perjury, Obstruction, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1998, at A1 (“While members proclaimed they cast votes
of conscience . . . they displayed remarkable party solidarity.”).
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1990s, the shift to a more partisan or tribal form of politics was well
underway.157 Republicans in the House and especially on the Judiciary
Committee made little effort to assure bipartisanship in the impeachment
process.158 As I discuss below, partly for this reason one can question
whether the lengthy Republican impeachment effort was “rational,”159 at
least in the specific sense of being likely to result in Clinton’s removal from
office.160 Republicans focused inward, making little effort to secure
bipartisan support. Because Republicans lacked the two-thirds majority
necessary for conviction in the Senate, the impeachment took on a quixotic
quality.161
The Starr Report and the proceedings before the Judiciary Committee
had an oddity that was perhaps insufficiently remarked on at the time. As
described earlier, in the Nixon impeachment, the Judiciary Committee staff
released a report that reviewed the standards for judging whether the
president had committed a high crime or misdemeanor.162 The staff
presented a competent argument that impeachable offenses were not limited
to indictable crimes.163 But this naturally raised the question of how best to
articulate the constitutional standard. They advocated no one formulation
but remarked that “the framers who discussed impeachment in the state
ratifying conventions, as well as other delegates who favored the
Constitution, implied that it reached offenses against the government, and
especially abuses of constitutional duties.”164 This was at least somewhat
helpful in evaluating Nixon’s conduct. Yet the Starr Report contained
nothing similar concerning the meaning of the Constitution with respect to
the scope of impeachable offenses.165 What was going on?166
157

See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 31–45 (2016)
(exploring the political climate and the increasing partisan divide in the 1980s and 1990s).
158
See PETER BAKER, THE BREACH: INSIDE THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF WILLIAM
JEFFERSON CLINTON 418 (2000) (arguing that the heavy partisanship displayed during President
Clinton’s impeachment hurt both Republicans and Democrats).
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See infra text accompanying note 169.
160
See Whittington, supra note 72, at 453 (noting the partisan backdrop of the Clinton
impeachment).
161
Nicol Rae and Colton Campbell argue that over time, the House Judiciary Committee became
“a bastion of each party’s ideological core rather than a consensus-oriented bipartisan panel.” RAE &
CAMPBELL, supra note 52, at 53–54, 85–91.
162
See STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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Id. at 22–25.
164
Id. at 14–15.
165
See Whittington, supra note 72, at 453–54 (discussing the “strictly legal focus” of Starr’s
criminal investigation at the expense of the broader constitutional question).
166
Somewhat strangely, Judge Posner contended that this omission by Starr was appropriate
because “no one knows what an impeachable offense is.” POSNER, supra note 4, at 78. This is not only
inaccurate and unhelpful considering the record of past impeachments, it represents an abdication of how
constitutional analysis is done. Posner could have looked back to the arguments during Watergate, for
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I suggest the relative lack of interest in articulating standards for
impeachment is telling. As we have seen, this was considered a critically
important issue in prior impeachments.167 Its failure to even make an
appearance in the Clinton impeachment suggested the existence of a norm
or constitutional convention that impeachments should be about criminality
rather than evaluating Clinton’s public conduct as president. I have
suggested that this norm evolved to handle the transition from a Constitution
based on a gentleman’s code of honor—the constitutional order of the early
republic—to the fractious world of organized party politics.168
Republicans may have outsmarted themselves in taking an aggressively
partisan path toward impeachment. Indeed, it is worth asking whether the
Republican effort to remove Clinton was rational, albeit in a very specific
sense.169 Of course, I am not suggesting a lack of mental competence on the
part of House Republicans. But there is a reasonable sense in which we may
ask: did Republicans in the House, especially those on the Judiciary
Committee, really want Clinton removed from office? Removal from office
requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate170 and although Republicans
controlled the Senate, they did not have two-thirds of the votes.171 Removing
Clinton necessarily required Democratic votes, and this meant the
impeachment effort had to be bipartisan.172 Yet it is not obvious that the
House Republican strategy was well-suited to providing a strong basis for
Democrats to remove Clinton from office. I suggest the reason they ignored
the need for bipartisan support is they were convinced that clear evidence of
federal crimes would be sufficient to guarantee impeachment.173 That is,
they may have been misled by their own overly narrow understanding of the
“high crimes and misdemeanors” standard. Once again, the party-political
nature of the process led to a focus on criminality.
As for the Senate, while the evidence supports the inference that some
Democrats were willing to vote for censure or some other confected

example, but he avoided looking to our constitutional history or practice to elucidate the meaning of the
“high crimes” standard.
167
See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B.
168
Id.
169
For further discussion, see Gerhardt, supra note 131, at 364.
170
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
171
See Robert H. Clarke, Official List of Members of the House of Representatives of the United
States and Their Places of Residence, CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1 (Dec. 3, 1998),
clerk.house.gov/105/olm105.pdf (listing 228 Republican members, 206 Democrat members, and 1
independent member of the 105th Congress).
172
See Gerhardt, supra note 131, at 366–67 (discussing generally the role of partisanship in
impeachment charges and specifically the Clinton impeachment).
173
RAE & CAMPBELL, supra note 52, at 63.
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sanction, they were not about to remove Clinton from office, especially
for misconduct (even including federal crimes) arising out of a dubious
private lawsuit that had nothing to do with the performance of his official
duties.175 In addition, because Republicans had taken such a partisan path,
they never devoted much attention to persuading the public at large. Bereft
of the backing of a broad majority of the American people, Republicans
advanced their impeachment effort into the headwinds of democratic
legitimacy.176
As with Clinton, so with Trump. The focus of impeachment talk with
respect to President Trump fits a now-familiar pattern: it revolves once again
around an investigation by a special prosecutor and allegations of federal
crimes, especially obstruction of justice.177 The notion that Trump should be
judged by a standard independent of the criminal process is rarely discussed.
It seems the Hamiltonian vision has receded from our sight.
III. PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT AND THE HISTORICAL LOGIC OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
The shift in impeachment standards we have traced from the eighteenth
century Hamiltonian vision to the contemporary party-political
constitutional order is a good example of informal constitutional change. As
I understand it, informal constitutional change is meaningful alteration of
the Constitution outside the Article V amendment process and, as illustrated
by the example of impeachment, it can be outside judicial interpretation of
the Constitution as well.178 What happened to the “high crimes and
misdemeanors” standard illustrates that the Supreme Court does not do all
the work of adapting the Constitution to match the times.
The Hamiltonian vision was that impeachments should focus on official
misconduct that amounts to abuse of the public trust.179 As we have seen,
174
The account of the Clinton impeachment by Peter Baker is helpful here. See BAKER, supra note
158, at 380–94 (detailing the politicking employed to defeat the bipartisan plan to censure President
Clinton).
175
The Supreme Court itself suggested the validity of the distinction between official duties and
private conduct in Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694–95 (1997).
176
The polls and expressions of public support ran consistently in Clinton’s favor and Republicans
suffered losses in the 1998 congressional elections, probably due in part because of their quest to remove
Clinton from office. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, A VAST CONSPIRACY 258, 304, 320, 338–40 (1999)
(discussing the publics’ growing distaste for the Republican-led invasion of the President’s private life);
Gerhardt, supra note 131, at 362 (“[A] majority of Americans throughout the [impeachment] proceedings
steadily opposed the President’s removal.”).
177
See, e.g., Harry Litman, Opinion, Trump’s Efforts to Oust Mueller Show the ‘Cancer’ on This
Presidency, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/opinion/trump-muellerfiring-cancer.html (arguing that President Trump obstructed justice by ordering the firing of special
counsel Robert Mueller in June 2017).
178
Griffin, supra note 7, at 3.
179
STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, supra note 120, at 13.
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what the Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton impeachments actually focused on
were questions of criminal guilt and sometimes dubious efforts at trying to
catch the President in a clear violation of law.180 To summarize how distant
our constitutional order is from that envisioned by the framers, I will first
speculate about how each presidential impeachment might have gone had
the Hamiltonian vision prevailed. I then turn to drawing lessons from the
impeachment experience for a broader understanding of the process of
informal constitutional change.
A. Viewing Presidential Impeachments Through an Eighteenth-Century
Lens
Let’s begin with Cass Sunstein’s recent nuanced review of the
eighteenth century precedents concerning the interpretation of “high crimes
and misdemeanors.”181 Sunstein insightfully captures the original meaning
of that standard as follows: “impeachable conduct . . . usually involved
serious abuses of the authority granted by public office, or, in other terms,
the kind of misconduct in which someone could engage only by virtue of
holding such an office.”182 Notice that the emphasis is not on criminality per
se, but rather toward making a judgment about the president’s performance
of his or her official duties.
This is another version of the standard I have dubbed the Hamiltonian
vision. Any attempt to apply this somewhat amorphous “public misconduct”
or public trust standard to the historical cases of presidential impeachment
is a speculative enterprise. In what follows, I am not trying to imagine what
Hamilton or other members of the founding generation would have thought
about the Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton impeachments. Rather, taking
Hamilton’s premises as seriously as I can, I am illustrating the gap between
his eighteenth century order and the party-political order we inhabit. Faithful
application of the Hamiltonian vision to the Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton
impeachments not only might have led to different outcomes, but perhaps to
a substantially different decision-making process.
The Johnson impeachment provides the easiest case. As we have seen,
Johnson abused his powers to frustrate a congressional policy of the highest
national importance, including obstructing the enforcement of laws passed
over his veto.183 In doing so, he stripped citizens who were counting on his
help for their protection from lawless retaliation and violence.184 He violated
180

See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B, II.C.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 34-37 (summarizing English precedents).
182
Id.
183
See Whittington, supra note 72, at 438–39 (noting Johnson’s belief that the President exercises
judgment to determine “whether legislation was constitutional” and “unconstitutional legislation could
not be binding on the President”).
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See discussion supra Section II.A.
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his oath of office in literal terms and thus betrayed the public trust. On
Hamiltonian grounds, Johnson should have been thrown out of office on his
ear and richly deserves the obloquy of history.
The Nixon impeachment is harder because much of what Nixon did was
hidden from the public.186 Relatively late in the impeachment process, the
House Judiciary Committee began publishing accurate transcripts of the
White House tapes which finally enabled the American people to judge for
themselves whether Nixon had lied and obstructed justice.187 However, if
our focus is Nixon’s public conduct in office, it is unnecessary to wait for
confirmation of criminal guilt. What matters is whether Nixon took actions
that were inconsistent with the public trust. Here the “Saturday Night
Massacre” looms large.188 It is noteworthy that many Americans shifted their
opinion of Nixon after this episode and the impeachment process began in
earnest.189 On the Hamiltonian understanding, Nixon could well have been
impeached for this action alone, as it clearly undermined public trust in the
conduct of his office, as well as obstructing justice in a lay sense.190
Furthermore, throughout the Watergate investigation, Nixon misled the
public in a way that showed he had a fundamental contempt not only for his
Democratic opponents, but for the American people as a whole.191 This is
surely inconsistent with the “public trust” understanding, which is at the
heart of the Hamiltonian vision.
With respect to the Clinton impeachment, consider an episode from the
middle of the Senate trial. Senator Robert Byrd, a moderate Democrat
considered a key vote by both sides, posed a question that cuts right to the
heart of my argument. Byrd asked the president’s lawyers to put aside the
legal arguments about perjury and obstruction of justice and focus on “the
charge that, by giving false and misleading statements under oath, such
‘misconduct’ abused or violated ‘some public trust.’”192 In asking this
question, Byrd directly invoked what I have termed the Hamiltonian vision.
From the perspective of the eighteenth century, this should have been the
central issue of the Clinton impeachment. Instead, Republicans were so
confident that the evidence in the Starr Report spoke for itself that they
neglected to make a case to the public that Clinton could no longer
185
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impeach President Nixon).
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See id. at 406 (explaining that firing Cox damaged Nixon’s credibility with the public, and that
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effectively serve as President.
To be sure, the gap between the original meaning of “high crimes and
misdemeanors” and later developments can be overstated. I do not mean to
suggest the framers were against removing a President for committing
criminal acts—at least criminal acts related to official duties.194 What
happened is that over the course of constitutional development, what could
be an impeachable offense was restricted de facto to a small subset of what
is allowed by the Constitution. Nonetheless, this restriction amounts to a
material alteration in the constitutional plan, given the sound reasons
reviewed in Part I for granting a check to Congress not limited to criminal
acts, both with respect to the president’s official actions and potential
failures to execute constitutional duties. Further, the issue is not that
Congress has been following a mistaken interpretation of the Constitution
but that, in some sense, it could not do otherwise without restructuring the
contemporary constitutional order (including the elimination of political
parties).
The record of these past impeachments suggests what was lost. During
the Johnson impeachment, the position taken by noted Senator Charles
Sumner showed what could have been had Congress been able to adhere to
the Hamiltonian vision. Sumner contended that the relevant standard was
whether, all things considered, Andrew Johnson should be permitted to
remain in office given his obstruction of Congress’ reconstruction laws.195
As summarized by Chief Justice Rehnquist, “[t]he overriding issue for
[Sumner] was not whether Andrew Johnson had violated the Tenure of
Office Act, but whether Andrew Johnson should continue to be president in
view of his repeated obstruction of the reconstruction policies of the Radical
Republicans.”196 If one is concerned to adhere to the Hamiltonian vision,
Sumner’s view strikes me as exactly right.197 Yet it is noteworthy that it
struck Rehnquist as dangerously “political,”198 tending toward a
parliamentary system in treating impeachment as a mere vote of confidence
rather than as a quasi-judicial determination of guilt.199 It is ironic that the
approach Rehnquist believed “political” was in fact much closer to the
Hamiltonian vision than the party-political path Rehnquist apparently
favored, with its consistent resort to sometimes strained charges of
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presidential criminality and violations of law.

B. Understanding the Historical Logic of Informal Constitutional Change
What happened to the “high crimes and misdemeanors” standard over
time is a microcosm of informal constitutional change. The same process
has been at work altering the constitutional meaning of, for example,
presidential war powers,201 national regulatory power under the Commerce
Clause,202 and, speaking broadly, the course of developments in the
doctrines of federalism and separation of powers. We can use the case study
of impeachment to inform a deeper understanding of what I am calling the
historical logic of informal constitutional change.203
What follows is a rough outline of this logic. The baseline for assessing
informal change is the self-understanding of the founding generation
concerning the design or plan of the Constitution and the expectations they
had for how it would work. Compared to, for example, ordinary criminal
law, constitutions generally are self-enforcing in the sense that there is no
agency external to the Constitution that can reliably assure its terms will be
respected. The Framers’ design thus had to be enforced through institutions
established by the Constitution itself. These institutions are effective at this
task if they are “built out” through state building in a way that enables them
to operationalize the design of the Constitution. A constitutional order is
then the totality of the design of the Constitution as implemented through
institutions in a given historical era. The Constitution’s status as an effective
supreme law depends on the ability of Americans and their institutions to
reproduce this order across time.
Institutionalization or state building is thus key to constitutional
enforcement. We should notice three details about the process of
institutionalization in the early republic. First, this process obviously works
more smoothly if there is substantial agreement coming out of the Federal
Convention and the ratification process as to the purposes and design of the
Constitution. Otherwise, the implementation of the Constitution and its
effective enforcement will fall prey to endless political disputes. Second,
although the judiciary can certainly play a role in ensuring the Constitution
is enforced, given its roots in the common law and thus its dependence on
specific cases, it cannot be expected to be solely responsible or even to
200
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necessarily have the lead role. Finally, changes in circumstance can pose
additional challenges. Such changes can be disagreements over the meaning
of the Constitution fueled by new political and policy controversies;
unanticipated problems that are difficult to address under the plan; and
institutional changes that alter the ability of the original constitutional order
to reproduce itself.205
The rise of nationally-organized mass political parties in the nineteenth
century is an example of this last kind of change.206 Parties are the way
society organizes itself for politics, and by the 1830s, American society was
very different from that of the Federalist early republic. Running
government based on a gentlemanly consensus was no longer possible (if it
ever was).207 Parties changed the way the Constitution could be enforced and
thus, the way presidential impeachment was understood. Because of the new
status of the President as party leader (rather than, say, patriot king),208 the
President would always have enthusiastic partisan defenders. As we have
seen, by the Johnson impeachment there was a widespread belief that
presidents could be impeached only for violations of the law.209 This was a
substantial alteration of the original constitutional order. From a practical
point of view, it was as if the Constitution had been formally amended. Yet
few were willing to admit this change.
This suggests another important feature of understanding informal
change under the American Constitution. Because of reverence for the
Constitution, Americans tend to resist the idea of formal amendment, even
when it is arguably necessary.210 At the same time, as changes amounting to
formal amendments occurred, everyone tended to behave as if the
constitutional order remained the same. This was as true in the early republic
as it is today.211 This feature requires some further explanation.
The antebellum debate over internal improvements is helpful in showing
the pervasiveness of this way of thinking.212 This seemingly never-ending
204
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conflict involved the assertion of federal power to construct roads, canals,
and other infrastructure of benefit to the nation.213 But proponents of these
improvements could not escape the charge, consistently pressed by fearful
opponents, that they were expanding federal power beyond that permitted
by the Constitution. Of course, amending the Constitution would cure the
difficulty. Or would it? The problem with asking for an amendment to
address a general question of power is that it concedes to the opposition party
that your proposal is contrary to the Constitution.214 Furthermore, asking for
an amendment might bring into question other issues thought settled. That
would mean recycling disputes such as the constitutionality of the national
bank.
For these reasons, historian Michael Vorenberg argues that prior to the
Civil War, Americans did not regard Article V as offering a reasonable way
to resolve their constitutional disputes.215 They saw the Constitution as
appropriately static and unchanging, consistent with the insightful argument
James Madison made in The Federalist No. 49.216 The controversy over
slavery illustrates this point. Even the tremendous political stresses caused
by the nullification crisis in the 1830s or Dred Scott v. Sandford217 in the
1850s, did not cause Americans to turn to amendments as solutions.218
Notice that the amendment avoidance stance of antebellum America
cuts across the standard debate over whether the framers made it too difficult
to amend the Constitution.219 Scholars have debated this issue by focusing
on the number of voting steps necessary for any amendment under Article
V.220 But as Vicki Jackson has pointed out, arguments asserting the general
difficulty or “impossibility” of amendment are typically underspecified
given the undoubted ratification of twenty-seven amendments, including
some that everyone agrees are of great importance as well as a few that were
ratified quickly.221 In this light, the supposed problem posed by Article V
213
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needs to be recast.
The difficulty of formal amendment that is most relevant is a product of
the founding generation attempting to achieve two conflicting goals at the
same time—enforcing constitutional limitations on government amid
changing circumstances, while also keeping the Constitution free of ordinary
political entanglements to preserve its stability. This conflict was heightened
by the intense suspicion of the opposition that pervaded antebellum
politics.222 Faced with this choice, Americans opted for political stability
above all else. As a consequence, the early American constitutional order
had a pronounced aversion to making changes through formal amendment.
As I have argued in prior work, this forced a significant amount of
constitutional change off-text.223
Highlighting the issue of amendment difficulty is consistent with a
living constitutionalist perspective. But my analysis goes beyond living
constitutionalism in significant respects—I term it “developmental”.224
Focusing on the specific case of presidential impeachment allows us to better
understand that difference. For example, the status of fundamental changes,
such as the advent of political parties, is left unclear in forms of living
constitutionalism that conceptualize change in incremental common law
terms.225 Sometimes change is more rapid and substantial. Further,
developmental analysis does not treat such changes as “extraconstitutional”
or exogenous to the Constitution. Rather, to the extent that political parties
became responsible for enforcing the Constitution, they were absorbed by
and became internal to the constitutional order.226
One practical implication of this approach is that if we admire the
Hamiltonian vision or think it constitutionally required by originalism, we
can then appreciate that restoring it is not a matter of simply correcting a
222
See LARSON, supra note 212, at 4 (discussing the tension between the different underlying
visions about the nature of liberty and the role of government as each side sought to determine the future
of the republican experiment).
223
GRIFFIN, supra note 108, at 40.
224
Besides the differences with living constitutionalism discussed in the text, another difference is
that developmental analysis does not suppose that it is up to contemporary Americans to remake the
Constitution as they see fit. Contemporary Americans are constrained by the routines and structures
imposed by the fundamental institutions the Constitution created, as well as later developments like
political parties. Changing a constitutional order is not a matter of shifting interpretations, but rather
changing the institutions themselves.
225
See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 119 (2010) (“Similarly, there are
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mistaken interpretation or making an effort of will to return to original
meaning. It would require a fairly radical restructuring of the contemporary
constitutional order to reduce or eliminate the role of political parties. If this
sounds farfetched (which it is), it is also a more accurate qualitative measure
of how far the contemporary constitutional order is removed from that of
Hamilton and his contemporaries.
In saying that the rejection of the Hamiltonian vision was a
constitutional change, I introduced the idea that it amounted to making a de
facto amendment outside Article V.227 But how does it make sense to say
that a change amounting to a formal amendment occurred? Let us
provisionally define an amendment as a consequential change to the
Constitution that in some sense cannot or should not be made through
ordinary common law interpretation. Understanding what changes count as
de facto amendments is then a matter of specifying an initial qualitative
baseline against which subsequent developments are measured. Observe that
I specified the initial baseline in terms of the design or expectations of the
Framers. This certainly differs from recent forms of originalism—such as
original public meaning—which rule out such reliance.228 Although it is not
my purpose to argue against originalism here, I should state the case for
using the Framers’ actual plans and expectations as the baseline.
The issue is not what is a sound originalist approach to understanding
change in the early republic—but what is a sound historical approach. They
are not necessarily the same. I contend that the baseline for assessing change
must be historicist.229 For my purposes, historicism is centrally concerned
with the context in which human action takes place, taking into
consideration the contingency of events and the causal relationships between
past and present.230 Context can be thought of as the situatedness of
historical actors in their own time. This is presumably the result of many
factors, including geography, climate, language, religion, culture, ideology,
race, gender, economic and social class, and so on. What is most crucial for
understanding the political and legal phenomenon we call constitutionalism
is the self-understanding of historical actors—the way they perceive their
own state of affairs—especially with respect to the meaning of the
Constitution.231
In studying impeachment, for example, rather than relying solely on the
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original public meaning of “high crimes and misdemeanors,” we looked to
how impeachment fit into the plan or design of the Constitution.232 We also
examined what Hamilton might have expected about the standards for public
officials given his background as an eighteenth century gentleman.233 We
then reviewed the very different understanding of this standard during the
Johnson impeachment and drew the conclusion that the meaning of the
standard had shifted dramatically.234 Our judgment that there was a shift in
meaning is thus based on the self-understanding the relevant historical actors
had with respect to the impeachment standard.
As may be apparent, this method is intended to track the approach used
by historians.235 Unlike originalists, I see no reason to reinvent the wheel.
One way to view my general project is that it tries to improve contemporary
constitutional analysis by taking more seriously the stance historians assume
toward the past.236 By contrast, the original public meaning approach
appears to license departing from the self-understanding of eighteenth
century historical actors. This may be hard to believe given the emphasis in
original public meaning scholarship on providing concrete evidence
concerning what the words and phrases in the Constitution meant in the
eighteenth century.237 It turns out that, as a practical matter, this approach
decouples semantic meaning from historical meaning as selfunderstanding.238 To put it more bluntly, the original public meaning
approach makes it possible to come up with meanings for constitutional
clauses that probably did not occur (or even could not have occurred) to
anyone at the Federal Convention or in the ratification debates.239 That
cannot be a sound approach to understanding the meaning of a historical
document like the Constitution.
232
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The shift in the understanding of the “high crimes and misdemeanors”
impeachment standard shows that informal constitutional change follows a
historical and historicist logic, rather than an originalist or legalist logic. As
the institutions responsible for constitutional enforcement change, so does
the meaning of the Constitution. Substantial informal change amounting to
an amendment can occur outside Article V because the Constitution is selfenforcing. There is no agency external to the constitutional order that can
somehow compel it (and us) to adhere to the eighteenth century design.240
Once meaningful institutional change occurs, such as the rise of organized
political parties, that design cannot be recovered.241 And perhaps we would
not want to, even if we could.
CONCLUSION
We are now in a better position to appreciate that if President Trump is
seriously threatened by an impeachment effort, for the Democrats to control
the House of Representatives will not be enough. They will have to produce
compelling evidence that he has committed a federal crime (such as
obstruction of justice), or at least a clear violation of a significant federal
law. Absent such strong evidence, history suggests they stand little chance
of removing him through the impeachment process.
Perhaps that is as it should be. This review of the Nation’s experience
with impeachment suggests that it is looking more and more as if the widely
esteemed Nixon impeachment effort was a one-off—something the
constitutional order could accomplish only under highly unusual conditions.
In any case, the meaning of the impeachment standard can be appreciated
only in light of our entire historical experience242 because it is that
experience that has meaningfully changed the original design of the
Constitution. Impeachment is one example of many243 in which changes to
the structure of the institutions responsible for constitutional enforcement
have created a different constitutional order—one which the Framers could
not anticipate.
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